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Abstract:
This paper develops a respondent model of Bayesian updating for a double-bound dichotomous
choice (DB-DC) contingent valuation methodology. We demonstrate by way of data simulations
that current DB-DC identifications of true willingness-to-pay (WTP) may often fail given this
respondent Bayesian updating context. Further simulations demonstrate that a simple extension
of current DB-DC identifications derived explicitly from our Bayesian updating behavioral
model can correct for much of the WTP bias. Additional results provide some caution to
viewing respondents as acting strategically toward the second bid. Finally, an empirical
application confirms the simulation outcomes.
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I. Introduction
The implementation by researchers of a double-bound dichotomous choice (DB-DC)
contingent valuation methodology (CVM) over a single-bound dichotomous choice (SB-DC)
CVM suggests incentive incompatible respondent behavior, which leads to biased (typically
downward) willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates (Carson, et al., 2000). Various specifications
exist for researchers to attempt to identify respondent true WTP by accounting for this apparent
shift of respondents’ latent true WTP between responses to the first and second bid amounts,
including models of structural shift (Alberini et al., 1997) and starting-point bias (Herriges and
Shogren, 1996). This paper develops a respondent model of Bayesian updating for a DB-DC
CVM that is used to demonstrate how existing identifications of unbiased respondent WTP may
often fail. However, we also show that a simple extension of the structural shift model, which is
derived explicitly from our Bayesian updating behavioral model, can correct for much of the
WTP bias.
While CVM respondents have been frequently modeled as Bayesian updaters (Horowitz,
1993; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; McLeod and Bergland, 1999; Whitehead, 2002; Flores and
Strong, 2004; and Aadland et al., 2005), updating in a DB-DC CVM is typically restricted to the
asking of the second bid amount2. If rational respondents are updating due to the second bid
amount, we believe it is also reasonable to expect rational respondents to be updating to the first
bid amount, and we therefore develop a respondent model of Bayesian updating to allow for this.
Consequently, our model of respondent Bayesian updating behavior may be interpreted as an
extension of the traditional starting-point bias models where respondents do not update prior to
responding to the first bid amount.

2

Aadland et al. (2005) is an exception to this in the DB-DC case, allowing updating on both the first and second bid
amounts.
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Using our respondent model of Bayesian updating behavior, we derive structural shift
specifications to allow for the identification of respondent true WTP in a DB-DC CVM given
updating on the second bid amount only, as well updating on both bid amounts.

These

specifications are comparable to the traditional structural shift model of Alberini et al., (1997)
which only includes a dummy variable for the asking of the second bid amount We show that
even if respondent Bayesian updating is restricted only to occur with the asking of the second bid
amount, the correct structural shift specification in this context includes an additional term that is
a function of the second bid amount. When respondents Bayesian update on both bid amounts,
we show that the correct structural shift specification in this context includes additional terms
that are functions of the first and second bid amounts, and true WTP from the correctly specified
structural shift model is not identifiable.
In order to demonstrate the extent of WTP bias in a respondent Bayesian updating
context for the two identifiable structural shift models (the traditional model with only the
dummy variable for the asking of the second bid amount, and the model we specify that also
includes a term that is a function of the 2nd bid amount), we simulate respondents updating on the
second bid amount only, as well updating on both bid amounts. Our simulations show that the
traditional structural shift estimation produces biased estimates of the true WTP when researcher
and respondent prior beliefs of the true WTP are not congruent, a result that places a heavy
emphasis on the precision of the survey pre-test and bid selection.

Furthermore, this

specification consistently produces biased estimates of the standard deviation of WTP.
Conversely, our simulations show that the incorporation of the term that is a function of the 2nd
bid amount can correct for much of the WTP bias and standard deviation of WTP bias generated,
except at high levels of respondent updating. Moreover, an empirical application of both of the

2
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identifiable structural shift models to the Alaska Exxon Valdez DB-DC dataset confirms the
simulation outcomes, with the key result being that our simple extension of the traditional
structural shift model is significantly different from zero.
Given the continued use of DB-DC CVMs by researchers and practitioners, as well as the
persistent notion that respondents are in fact uncertain about their true WTP (see, e.g., Li and
Mattsson, 1995; Ready et al, 1995; Cameron and Englin, 1997; Wang, 1997; Loomis and
Ekstrand, 1998; Park, 2003), our results are noteworthy. Indeed, a practical solution is offered
that identifies true WTP for uncertain respondents that are rationally acting as Bayesian updaters
in a DB-DC CVM (certainly for those suspected of only updating on the second bid amount).
The results also advise caution to the perception that respondents are acting strategically toward
the asking of the second bid amount (Carson, et al., 2000), or as Aadland et al. (2005) state that,
“Once one takes this Bayesian perspective of WTP formation, the recent discussion of the
incentive incompatibility of DB-DC formats changes markedly.”
This paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the respondent Bayesian updating
model; Section III discusses the identification of true WTP given the Bayesian framework;
Section IV provides an overview of the data simulation; Section V presents the results of the
estimation; Section VI applies both of the identifiable structural shift models to the Alaska DBDC dataset ; and Section VII provides concluding comments.

II. Respondent Bayesian Updating Model
Each of the ith individual DB-DC CVM respondents has WTPi consisting of two
components
WTPi = θ + µi

3

[1]
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where θ is an unknown component that is common to all respondents, and µi is a known,
idiosyncratic component. A possible interpretation of [1] is that respondent i knows he values
the natural resource that is the focus of the CVM by more or less than the average person, by an
amount µi.

In this interpretation, the expectation over all individuals is simply E(µ) = 0.

Although respondent i does not know θ, he holds prior beliefs that it is a draw from a normal
distribution with mean θi and variance σ θ 2 .
Let bi1 and bi2 denote the first and second bid amounts offered to respondent i as per the
DB-DC CVM standard protocol. Given respondent i's WTP uncertainty, he interprets each of
the j = 1,2 offered bids as a signal of the true value of θ such that he believes
bij = (θ + α ij ) + ε ij

[2]

(

)

where αij is a constant known by individual i, and he assumes that ε ij ∼ N 0, σ εij 2 . That is, he
interprets bij − α ij as independent and unbiased signals of θ.
From [1], respondent i's prior belief of WTPi is that it is normally distributed with mean

θi + µi and variance σ θ 2 . Let WTPij denote E(WTPi) after receiving j offered bids. Then,
WTPi 0 = θ i + µi . Using standard Bayesian formulae for normal conjugates3, i's posterior beliefs

of WTPi after receiving the first bid, bi1, is normal with mean

WTPi1 = µi +

θi ⋅ σ ε

(σ

2

θ

2
i1

+ σ εi1 2

+

( bi1 − α i1 ) ⋅ σ θ 2

) (σ

2

θ

+ σ ε i1 2

[3]

)

and variance

3

While other Bayesian updating representations could ostensibly be used, the normal conjugate importantly allows
for tractable results
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σ i12 =

σθ 2 ⋅σ ε

(σ

2

θ

2

[4]

i1

)

+ σ ε i1 2

Given that the respondent is updating on both bid amounts under the reasonable assumption that
they interpret both bids as being independent, when receiving the second bid, bi2, [3] and [4]
become i's prior beliefs such that the posterior beliefs after hearing bi2 are also normal with mean
WTPi 2 = µi +

(WTPi1 − µi ) ⋅ σ ε

(σ

2
i1

2
i2

)

+ σ εi 2 2

bi 2 − α i 2 ) ⋅ σ i12
(
+

(σ

2

+ σ εi 2 2

i1

[5]

)

and variance

2

σ i2 =

σ i12 ⋅ σ ε

(σ

2
i1

2

[6]

i2

+ σ εi 2 2

)

Substituting for (WTPi1 − µi ) and σ i12 in [5] and [6] from [3] and [4], [5] and [6] can be rewritten
such that

WTPi 2 = µi +

( bi 2 − α i 2 ) (σ θ 2 ⋅ σ ε
σ θ 2 (σ ε 2 + σ ε
i1

2
i2

) + (σ

) + (σ ) ( b
)(σ ) σ (σ
2

2
i1

2

εi 2

εi 2

2

2

ε i1

− α i1 ) (σ θ 2 ) + (θi ) σ ε i1 2 

2
2
2
2
+ σ ε i 2 σ ε i1
εi1 + σ εi 2

(

i1

θ

) (

)(

)

)

[7]

and

σ i 22 =

σθ 2 ⋅σ ε 2 ⋅σ ε
i1

σ θ 2 (σ ε 2 + σ ε
i1

2

2

) + (σ )(σ )
2

2

εi 2

i2

[8]

i2

ε i1

Using WTPi 0 = θ i + µi , [3] and [7] can be simplified further to

WTPi1 = WTPi 0

(b
+

i1

− α i1 − θ i ) ⋅ σ θ 2

(σ

2

θ

+ σ εi1 2

[9]

)

and
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WTPi 2 = WTPi 0

(b
+

i2

(

)

(

− α i 2 − θi ) (σ θ 2 ) σ ε i1 2 + ( bi1 − α i1 − θi ) (σ θ 2 ) σ ε i 2 2

σ θ (σ ε + σ ε
2

2

i1

2
i2

)

[10]

) + (σ )(σ )
2

εi 2

2

ε i1

III. Identification of True WTP
In conducting a CVM, the goal of the researcher is to obtain the respondent’s prior beliefs
of WTP, WTPi0. For example, as Herriges and Shogren (1996, pg. 117) note, “... it is the
household’s prior held beliefs that the policymaker should be interested in, not the posterior
WTP estimates that are artificially influenced by an optimal bid design.” Therefore, we consider
the ability to identify a respondent’s true WTP, WTPi0, from our Bayesian updating framework
for the three different possible respondent signaling perspectives of our model: 1) neither bid
provides a signal; 2) only the 2nd bid provides a signal; or 3) both bids provide a signal.

Neither Bid Provides A Signal

If respondent i believes that neither of the j = 1,2 offered bids contains a signal, then

σ ε 2 → ∞ . If this is the case, then from [9] and [10], WTPi 2 = WTPi1 = WTPi 0 . Therefore, true
ij

WTP can be identified from the responses to both questions by DB-DC estimation with
associated efficiency gains over estimation using only responses to the first bid amount
(Hanemann et al., 1991).

2nd Bid Only Provides A Signal

If it is the case that respondent i believes that information concerning θ is contained in the
second bid only, then σ ε i1 2 → ∞ and σ εi 2 2 < ∞ . From [9] we see that WTPi1 = WTPi 0 . However,
in this case WTPi2 does not follow from [10], as [3] and [4] no longer represent respondent i's

6
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prior beliefs when they receive bi2. Instead, respondent i has prior beliefs with mean θi and
variance σ θ 2 when they receive bi2. Thus, again using standard Bayesian formulae for normal
conjugates, i's posterior beliefs of WTPi after receiving bi2 is normal with mean
WTPi 2 = µi +

θi ⋅ σ ε

(σ

2

θ

2

bi 2 − α i 2 ) ⋅ σ θ 2
(
+

i2

+ σ εi 2 2

) (σ

2

θ

+ σ εi 2 2

)

[11]

which, again using WTPi 0 = θ i + µi , can be simplified further to

WTPi 2 = WTPi 0

(b
+

i2

− α i 2 − θi ) ⋅ σ θ 2

(σ

2

θ

+ σ εi 2 2

)

In this case, it therefore follows from [9] and [12] that WTPi 2 ≠ WTPi1 = WTPi 0 .

[12]

Consequently,

WTP estimates derived from the responses to the first bid are able to provide a consistent
estimation of true WTP, but estimates derived from responses to both bids will be inconsistent
unless an adequate control for the second response is introduced.
Alberini et al.’s (1997) structural shift dummy variable, adapted to our notation, is
specified as
WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + ηi
WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ i + ηi

[13]

where δi is the coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that takes on the value one for
responses to the second question. However, it is clear from [12] that the correct specification in
a Bayesian updating context should also include an interaction term between δi and the
magnitude of bi2 4, that is
WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + ηi
WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 − (α i 2 + θ i ) δ i′ + δ i′ ( bi 2 ) + ηi

[14]

4

Alberini et al. (1997, pg. 319) note that “δ could also be a function of additional explanatory variables including
the cost amount or the change in cost amounts.”
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(

)

where δ i′ = σ θ 2 / σ θ 2 + σ ε i 2 2 .

Because

α i 2 , θi , σ θ 2 and σ ε

2
i2

are

not

observable,

− (α i 2 + θi ) δ i′ and δ i′ are two individual-specific parameters. Assuming they are common to all
individuals (Alberini et al., 1997) such that δ i′ = δ , yields the system

WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + ηi

[15]

WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ 0 I 2 + δ 1 I 2 ( bi 2 ) + ηi

where I2 is a dummy variable indicating the asking of the second bid amount. From [15] we see
that in a respondent Bayesian updating context, the correct structural shift specification is
dependent upon the size of the second bid amount. Therefore, true WTP is able to be identified
from the responses to both questions with the appropriate dummy variable specification by
stacking the data and estimating a conventional single-bound model (SB-DC) that has two
observations for each respondent.

Both Bids Provide A Signal
Finally, if it is the case that respondent i believes that information concerning θ is
contained in both bid amounts, then σ ε i1 2 < ∞ and σ ε i 2 2 < ∞ . If this is the case, from [9] and [10]
we have WTPi 2 ≠ WTPi1 ≠ WTPi 0 . Consequently, unbiased estimates of WTP will only be able to
be derived if an adequate control for both responses is implemented in the estimation.
Again, adapting Alberini et al.’s (1997) structural shift dummy variable to our notation
with respondent updating on both bid amounts we have that

WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + δ i1 + ηi
WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ i 2 + ηi

[16]

where δi1 is a coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that takes on the value one for
responses to the first question, and δi2 is a coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that
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takes on the value one for responses to the second question. Allowing the δi’s to be functions of
the bid amounts (which naturally follows from our respondent Bayesian updating context as per
the second term on the right-hand side of both [9] and [10]) [16] can now be specified as

WTPi1 = WTPi 0 − (α i1 + θi ) δ i′1 + δ i′1 ( bi1 ) + ηi

[17]

WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 − (α i 2 + θi ) δ i′2 + δ i′2 ( bi 2 ) − (α i1 + θi ) δ i′′2 + δ i′′2 ( bi1 ) + ηi

(

)

where δ i′1 = σ θ 2 / σ θ 2 + σ ε i1 2 ,

δ i′′2 = (σ θ 2 ) (σ ε

2
i2

) / σ (σ
2

θ

2

εi1

δ i′2 = (σ θ 2 ) (σ ε

) (

)(

2
i1

) / σ (σ

)

+ σ ε i 2 2 + σ ε i 2 2 σ ε i1 2 .

2

θ

2

ε i1

) (

)(

)

+ σ ε i 2 2 + σ ε i 2 2 σ εi1 2 ,

Assuming

the

and

individual-specific

parameters are common to all individuals, the following system is specified

WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + δ 0 I1 + δ 1 I1 ( bi1 )ηi
WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ 2 I 2 + δ 3 I 2 ( bi 2 ) + δ 4 I 2 + δ 5 I 2 ( bi1 ) + ηi

[18]

There are restrictions on these parameters, for example, if α i1 = α i 2 , then δ 2 / δ 3 = δ 4 / δ 5 . But
despite these potential restrictions, it is clear that WTPi0 cannot be identified.

For the three different possible respondent signaling perspectives of our Bayesian
updating model, we have shown that the identification of true WTP is only possible for two of
them given that the appropriate WTP estimation model has been specified. Since in conducting a
CVM it is the goal of the researcher to obtain the respondent’s true WTP, it is essential to
understand the extent of bias (and if possible to correct for it) inherent in the estimated WTP if it
is the case that respondents are updating on both bids and the researcher cannot specify the
correct WTP estimation model, or where respondents are only updating on the second bid but the
researcher has specified a WTP estimation model that does not contain the appropriate dummy
variable specification.

9
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IV. Data Simulation
In order to demonstrate the extent of WTP bias in a respondent Bayesian updating
context for the two identifiable structural shift models (the traditional model, [13], and our
extension of this model, [15]), we simulate respondents updating on the second bid amount only,
as well updating on both bid amounts. Faced with a randomly selected bid amount, a CVM
respondent will say yes to bij when WTPij is greater than bij, and no when it is less. Therefore, in
a DB-DC CVM when respondents are updating on bi2 only, yes/no responses are generated
according to:

1 WTP = WTP + ( bi 2 −αi 2 −θi )⋅σθ > b
i2
i0
i2
(σθ 2 +σ εi 2 2 )

1 WTPi1 = WTPi 0 > bi1
, yesi 2 = 
yesi1 = 
b −α −θ ⋅σ 2
 0 WTPi1 = WTPi 0 < bi1
0 WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + ( i 2 2i 2 i )2 θ < bi 2
(σθ +σ εi 2 )

2

[19]

where WTPi 0 = θ i + µi . And, when respondents are updating on both bi1 and bi2, yes/no responses
are generated according to:

1 WTP = WTP + ( bi1 −αi1 −θi )⋅σθ > b
i1
i0
i1
(σ θ 2 + σ ε i 1 2 )

yesi1 = 
,
b −α −θ ⋅σ 2
0 WTPi1 = WTPi 0 + ( i1 2i1 i )2 θ < bi1
(σθ +σ εi1 )

2

1 WTP = WTP + ( bi 2 −αi 2 −θi )(σθ 2 )(σ εi12 ) +( bi1 −αi1 −θi )(σθ 2 )(σ εi 2 2 ) > b
i2
i0
i2
σ θ 2 (σ εi 12 +σ ε i 2 2 ) + (σ ε i 2 2 )(σ εi 1 2 )

yesi 2 = 
2
2
2
2
0 WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + ( bi 2 −αi 2 −θi )2(σθ )(2 σ εi1 )2+ (bi1 −αi21 −θi )(σ2 θ )(σ εi 2 ) < bi 2
σ θ (σ ε i1 +σ εi 2 ) + (σ εi 2 )(σ εi1 )


[20]

where WTPi 0 = θ i + µi .
We specify our values for θi , µi , σ θ 2 , α ij , σ ε ij 2 , and bij as summarized in Table 1.5 For
each of the eight specified σ εi1 values, per each of the three specified bi1 mean values of Table 1,

5

Typical CVM initial bids are centered around a single value with specified increments (e.g., 25, 50, 75, 100, 125,
150, 200). We have not specified any such increments in drawing our initial bids from a normal distribution. We do
not feel this comprises the analysis.
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we generate 1000 samples each of sample size 1000. Given the generated sample data, yes/no
responses follow from [19] and [20]. Figure 1 provides an example of generated DB-DC yes/no
responses for an illustrative respondent that does not Bayesian update on either bid, updates on
the second bid only ( σ ε i 2 2 = 10 ), and updates on both bids ( σ ε i1 2 = 10, and σ ε i 2 2 = 10 ).

V. Estimation and Results
In addition to the generated DB-DC yes/no responses and associated bid amounts from
the data simulation, an intercept (the only independent variable used in order to represent WTPi)
and the appropriate bi2 dummy variable(s) from [13] and [15] complete the datasets to be
estimated. The introduction of the structural shift dummy variable(s) requires the data to be
stacked, and therefore maximum likelihood estimation of WTP follows from the conventional
SB-DC model of Cameron and James (1987), but with two observations for each respondent.
We perform probit and logit maximum likelihood estimation for the 1000 samples for each
specification. Because probit and logit simulations are qualitatively similar, only logit estimation
results are presented below.

Structural Shift Model with only the Dummy Variable for the Asking of the Second Bid
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the results from [13] for the estimated mean WTP and
standard deviation of WTP respectively, when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal
distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents are updating on both
bid amounts. Estimates of the 97.5 and 2.5 percentiles of mean WTP and standard deviation of
WTP are also illustrated in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) respectively as a measure of the variability of

11
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these estimates across the eight specified σ εi1 values6.

Furthermore, although the results

presented are based upon the simulated responses to both bid amounts, for high levels of σ εi1
(denoted sig eps_1 in the figures) along the x-axis, the results can be interpreted as respondents
updating only on the second bid amount. In this way, the figures simultaneously present the
results for the estimated mean WTP, standard deviation of WTP, and the associated 97.5 and 2.5
percentiles in both of the respondent Bayesian updating contexts.7
While Figure 2(a) shows that the results of estimated mean WTP are unbiased8 vs. the
true value of 100, Figure 2(b) indicates that the estimated standard deviation of WTP is biased
upward vs. the true value of 20 for all levels of σ εi1 . These general bias results hold whether the
respondent is updating on either both bid amounts, or only the second bid amount. However, the
upward bias of the standard deviation of WTP becomes larger as less updating is occurring on
the first bid amount. Additionally, while the variability of the estimates of mean WTP remains
relatively constant over the specified levels of σ εi1 , the variability of the estimates of standard
deviation of WTP increases with higher levels of σ εi1 (i.e., with less updating on the first bid
amount). Therefore, in the case where researchers select initial bid amounts from a distribution
that is centered on respondent’s prior beliefs of true WTP = 100, unbiased estimates of mean
WTP with relatively constant variability are generated, although the standard deviation of the
these estimates is biased upward with both the bias and the variability of the standard deviation
estimates increasing as respondents update less on the first bid amount.

6

Results for

σε

i1

= 1000 are not shown for aesthetic purposes, but are approximate to the results for

σε

i1

= 100.

7

This is true for all of the other estimation figures associated with this model, namely Figures 3(a) and 3(b)
T-tests at the 1% level are used to confirm the presence of bias for all estimation results of mean WTP and
standard deviation of WTP unless otherwise noted.

8
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But what about the case where researchers prior beliefs of true WTP do not match to
those of respondents, a case that seems to be more likely to occur in the implementation of a
CVM? Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the results from [13] for the estimated mean WTP and
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal
distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100, and the respondents are updating
on both bid amounts9. In this case, both the estimates of the mean WTP and the standard
deviation of WTP are biased when respondents are updating on both bid amounts, and also when
respondents are updating only on the second bid amount. From Figure 3(a) we see that for
strong updating on both bid amounts (low levels of σ εi1 ), mean WTP is biased downward from
true WTP = 100 with little variability in the estimates. In fact, for complete updating on the first
bid amount ( σ εi1 =0), estimated WTP is the mean of the bid distribution = 50. However, with
less updating on the first bid amount, estimated mean WTP is biased upward from true WTP =
100 and contains more variability in the estimates. Estimated standard deviation of WTP is
again biased upward vs. the true value of 20 for all levels of σ εi1 , but in this case the upward bias
and variability of the standard deviation estimates are more constant over the specified levels of

σε .
i1

To better understand the source of the bias, Table 2 illustrates the shifts in the
percentages of Yes-Yes, Yes-No, No-Yes, and No-No responses between respondents not
updating on either bid, and those updating on both bids when σ εi1 =2 and σ ε i 2 =10. When
respondents do not update on either bid presented to them, and given that the presented initial bid
value is drawn from a normal distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100,

9

The opposite mean WTP graph is produced when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal distribution with
mean exceeding the true WTP, i.e., 150 > 100
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more than 90% of the DB-DC responses fall into either the Yes-Yes or Yes-No vote categories
as would be expected. Due to the high levels of Yes votes in this non-updating scenario,
responses primarily fall into bounded intervals only above the initial bid amount = 50, and
estimated mean WTP is able to move to the true WTP = 100. However, when respondents are
updating (relatively strongly) on both bid amounts, there is a remarkable decrease in Yes-Yes
votes and corresponding increase in No-Yes and No-No votes. As can be inferred from the
Bayesian updating example of Figure 1, for strong enough updating as well as relatively close
true WTP and initial bid amounts, initial yes responses in a non-updating context are easily
reversed. Therefore, responses no longer primarily fall into bounded intervals only above the
initial bid amount = 50, and estimated mean WTP is not able to approach true WTP = 100.
These overall estimation results for the traditional structural shift model indicate that, in a
respondent Bayesian updating context, this model fails to generate unbiased estimates of mean
WTP unless the initial bid amount is centered on respondent’s prior beliefs. Unfortunately,
achieving initial bid amounts that are centered on respondent’s prior beliefs is a case that would
appear to be seemingly rare in practice, or at the very least places a heavy burden on the typical
CVM pre-test. That is, it is reasonable to assume that pre-test respondents would also be
Bayesian updating, and therefore results from a pre-test would not provide any further insight
into how to adjust the bid amounts to be centered on respondent’s prior beliefs of what is true
WTP.

Moreover, these overall estimation results for the traditional structural shift model

indicate that, in a respondent Bayesian updating context, this model always fails to generate
unbiased estimates of the standard deviation of WTP.

Structural Shift Model that also Includes a Term that is a Function of the Second Bid
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Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the results from [15] for the estimated mean WTP and
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal
distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents are updating on both
bid amounts. Estimates of the 97.5 and 2.5 percentiles of mean WTP and standard deviation of
WTP are also illustrated in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) respectively as a measure of the variability of
these estimates across the eight specified σ εi1 values10.

Furthermore, although the results

presented are based upon the simulated responses to both bid amounts, for high levels of σ εi1
(denoted sig eps_1 in the figures) along the x-axis, the results can be interpreted as respondents
updating only on the second bid amount. In this way, the figures simultaneously present the
results for the estimated mean WTP, standard deviation of WTP, and the associated 97.5 and 2.5
percentiles in both of the respondent Bayesian updating contexts.11
While Figure 4(a) shows that the results of estimated mean WTP are still unbiased vs. the
true value of 100, Figure 4(b) indicates that the previous bias in the standard deviation of WTP =
20 from the traditional structural shift model of Figure 2(b) has dissipated. Furthermore, the
variability of both the estimated mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP has decreased
significantly as evidenced by the tighter 97.5 and 2.5 percentile lines. However, we do start to
see evidence of increased variability of mean WTP estimates, as well as evidence of bias and
increased variability of estimates for the standard deviation of WTP for high levels of updating
on bid 1 (low levels of σ εi1 )12. These results at the least therefore indicate that this specification
does a better job then the traditional structural shift model in producing unbiased estimates of the

10
11
12

Results for

σε

i1

= 1000 are not shown for aesthetic purposes, but are approximate to the results for

σε

i1

= 100.

This is true for all of the other estimation figures associated with this model, namely Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
Convergence issues at these low levels (i.e., σ ε i1 < 10) prevent us at this time from making a more definitive

statement concerning bias and depicting the results graphically.

15

9/6/2006

standard deviation of WTP when it is believed that respondents update only on the second bid
amount.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate results from [15] for the estimated mean WTP and
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal
distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100, and the respondents are updating
on both bid amounts. Contrasting Figures 5(a) and 5(b) with Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we clearly see
the improvement in reduced bias over the traditional structural shift model for both the estimates
of mean WTP and the standard deviation of WTP. We also see improvements in the variability
of both the estimated mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP as evidenced by the tighter 97.5
and 2.5 percentile lines. We again, however, start to see evidence of increased variability of
mean WTP estimates, as well as evidence of bias and increased variability of estimates for the
standard deviation of WTP for high levels of updating on bid 1 (low levels of σ εi1 )13.
These overall estimation results for the structural shift model we specify that also
includes a term that is a function of the 2nd bid amount indicate that in a respondent Bayesian
updating context, unbiased and less variable estimates of mean WTP and standard deviation of
WTP can be generated. The results certainly hold well for the case where respondents are only
updating on the second bid amount as is typically perceived in the DB-DC CVM literature. For
the case where respondents are updating on both bids, even though there is some indication of
bias for high levels of updating on bid 1, obvious improvement over the traditional structural
shift model in terms of reduced bias estimates of mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP is
demonstrated.

13

Convergence issues at these low levels (i.e.,

σε

i1

< 10) prevent us at this time from making a more definitive

statement concerning bias and depicting the results graphically.
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Investigating Respondent Strategic Behavior
DB-DC WTP bias from a structural shift model is typically indicated as being downward
due to the estimated negative δ coefficient (Alberini et al., 1997; Whitehead, 2002).
Furthermore, Carson et al. (2000) have discussed various strategic behavior theories as to how
agents may interpret this second price signal in order to explain the WTP downward bias. We
show, in fact that it is the asymmetry induced by the standard DB-DC CVM protocol of halving

bi1 for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response that generates the
negative δ coefficient in a respondent Bayesian updating context, not necessarily respondent
strategic behavior.
Table 3 presents results from two different estimations of [13] when the initial bid value
is drawn from a normal distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents
are updating on both bid amounts with σ ε i1 2 = 25, and σ ε i 2 2 = 10 . In the first estimation, bi2 is
generated by halving bi1 for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response
(the standard DB-DC CVM protocol). In the second estimation, bi2 is generated as (bi1 – 60) for
an initial no response, and (bi1 + 60) for an initial yes response. We do generate a (-) δ
coefficient in the standard halving/doubling bi2 generation, but the (-) δ coefficient disappears in
our [bi1 (+)/(–) 60] estimation. Clearly, respondent strategic behavior cannot be inferred simply
from the generation of a (-) δ coefficient for a DB-DC CVM where bi2 is generated by halving bi1
for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response and respondents are acting
as Bayesian updaters.
Our simulation results already presented in Figures 2(a) – 5(b) have all assumed the
respondent’s known constant of the signal, α ij , from

[2] to equal 0.

If believing that

respondents are in fact acting strategically similarly to one of the Carson et al. (2000) strategic
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behavior theories, allowing α ij ≠ 0 allows for investigation of bias in this strategic behavior
context. For example, if respondents feel that the researcher has placed them into a bargaining
situation they will feel that the bij presented to them has been purposefully inflated. In this case,

α ij < 0 in order to counteract the perceived bid inflation.
Figures 6(a) – 7(b) present mean WTP simulation results14 with α ij = -20 for both
structural shift identifications of [13] and [15], as well as where bi1 = true WTP = 100 and where

bi1 = 50 < true WTP = 100. In this strategic behavior context, we now see upward bias being
generated for the case where researcher priors are compatible with respondent priors of true
WTP =100 as shown by Figure 6(a). The structural shift specification including the term for bi2
still appears to be able to correct for the generated bias as shown by Figure 7(a), although not at
as low of levels of σ εi1 as when α ij = 0. These results indicate that the specification of [15] is
even more important in a possible strategic behavior Bayesian updating context.

VI. Empirical Application
Carson et al. (1992) conducted a DB-DC CVM for the State of Alaska in order to obtain a
WTP value “to prevent another Exxon Valdez type oil spill”. Median WTP = $31 was estimated
from respondents’ answers to both CVM questions using an interval DB-DC model assuming a
Weibull distribution. As a check on the sensitivity of the estimated DB-DC median WTP value,
median WTP = $41 was also estimated from answers to the first question only using a SB-DC
model assuming a log-normal distribution. Given the disparity between the SB-DC and DB-DC
WTP estimates, they conclude that a slight downward bias exists between respondents’ answers
to only the first bid amount and answers to both bid amounts. Indeed, Carson et al. (2003) note
14

Standard deviation of WTP graphical results are not presented, but are still biased as was the case where
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that the structural shift model of Alberini et al. (1997) could be used to account for this
downward bias. We therefore use the Alaska dataset to estimate WTP from the two identifiable
structural shift models of this paper (the traditional model, [13], and our extension of this model,
[15]).
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates following from the conventional SBDC model of Cameron and James (1987) using the Alaska study responses to the first bid amount
only. Additionally, Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for the two identifiable
structural shift models of [13] and [15] using the Alaska study responses to both bid amounts
with the data being stacked to account for the introduction of the structural shift dummy
variable(s). Only an intercept and the appropriate bi2 dummy variable(s) from [13] and [15] are
used in the estimation, and a log-normal distribution has been assumed in order to follow the
results of Carson et al. (1992).
Our SB-DC estimation produces an estimate of 3.73 for the intercept, equating to a
median WTP15 = $41.58, with the standard deviation of WTP estimated at 3.15. This WTP
result closely mirrors the median WTP = $41.44 of Carson et al. (1992).

The traditional

structural shift model of [13] produces an estimate of 4.18 for the intercept, equating to median
WTP = $65.54, and 19.73 for the standard deviation of WTP. Also, although a negative
coefficient is generated for the 2nd question dummy variable, it is significant only up to the 10%
level. The structural shift model of [15] that we specify that also includes a term that is a
function of the 2nd bid amount produces an estimate of 3.83 for the intercept, equating to median
WTP = $46.14, and 7.01 for the standard deviation of WTP. Importantly, the additional term
that is a function of the 2nd bid amount is significant at the 1% level. A standard likelihood ratio
test between [13] and [15] indicates that [15] in fact fits the Alaska data better.
15

Given the log-normal distribution, median WTP = exp(βx’) with βx’ being the intercept.
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This empirical application demonstrates, similar to our simulations, that if one believes
respondents are only updating on the second bid amount and hence true WTP is represented by
SB-DC estimates, than the structural shift model of [15] does a better job of estimating a less
biased true WTP when utilizing a DB-DC CVM approach compared to the traditional structural
shift model of [13]. Of course, if respondents are updating on both bid amounts, true WTP may
not be identifiable as has been shown.

VII. Conclusions
We have shown why existing structural shift models used to estimate unbiased WTP
from a DB-DC CVM are theoretically incapable of doing so in a Bayesian updating context due
to misspecification and identification issues.

Through our data simulations we have

demonstrated the extent of the WTP bias when the identifiable, yet misspecified structural shift
model is used. The results are most serious when researcher and respondent prior beliefs of true
WTP are not congruent. We suggest a more properly specified structural shift model following
from the respondent Bayesian updating behavioral model that includes an additional term that is
a function of the second bid amount. Our data simulations show that this specification can
correct for much of the potential WTP bias. An empirical application to the Alaska Exxon
Valdez DB-DC dataset confirms the simulation outcomes, with the key result being that our
simple extension of the traditional structural shift model is significantly different from zero.
The results of the paper also offer an alternative to the perception that respondents act
strategically in a DB-DC CVM, and that their responses are not incentive compatible between
questions. Rather, uncertain respondents act rationally by incorporating information signaled to
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them through both of the presented bid amounts. Not accounting for this possibility in the
structural shift estimation leads to biased estimates of the respondent’s true WTP.

21

9/6/2006

Table 1. Specified Values for θi , µi , σ θ 2 , α ij , σ ε ij 2 , and bij Used In the Data Simulation
Category

Variable SpecifiedValue

θi

100 ∀ i

µi

~N(0,σ) and σ=20

Standard Deviation
of Prior Beliefs

σθ

20

Signal known
constant

α ij

0

σε

i1

1000, 100, 50, 25, 10, 5, 2, 0

i2

10

WTPi0

Strength of
Updating
Bids

σε

bi1

~N(100,σ), ~N(50,σ), ~N(150,σ) and σ=30

bi2

(bi1)*2, or (bi1)*1/2 for yes or no to bi1 respectively
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Table 2. % of YY, YN, NY, NN Responses for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ I 2 + ηi 2

DB-DC
No
Updating on
Response Updating Both Bids
YY
50%
8%
YN

42%

43%

NY

8%

34%

NN

0%

15%
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Table 3. δ Coefficient Results For Halving/Doubling, And (+)/(-) 60 bi2 Generation

WTP

δ
σ

Estimates
halving/doubling
100.1

Estimates
(+)/(-) 60
100.0

-18.9

0.2

93.7

135.3
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Table 4: Alaska Study Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter

SB-DC

Traditional
Structural Shift

Structural Shift
with Bid
Interaction

intercept

3.7276
(29.91)

4.1827
(5.064)

3.8316
(13.784)

-7.7975
(-1.723)

-4.1345
(-4.232)

δ0

0.0216
(4.606)

δ1

σ

3.1493
(7.293)

19.7323
(1.785)

7.0067
(3.886)

log L

-695.52

-1400.00

-1392.07

n

1043

2086

2086

Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis
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Figure 1. An Example of Generated Yes/No Responses Based Upon No Bayesian Updating,
Updating on the Second Bid Only, and Updating on Both Bids for a Single Respondent

WTPi0 = 96, bi1 = 46

Non-Bayes
96 > 46
Yes

Bayes (both bids)
WTPi1 = 54 > 46
Yes

Bayes (2nd bid)
WTPi1 = 96 > 46
Yes

bi2 = (46)*(2) = 92

Non-Bayes
96 > 92
Yes

Bayes (both bids)
WTPi2 = 70 < 92
No

Yes/No Results:
Non-Bayes
Bayes (both)
Bayes (2nd)

Bid 1
1
1
1
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Bid 2
1
0
0

9/6/2006

Figure 2. Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ I 2 + ηi 2 , where E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100.
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP
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Figure 3. Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ I 2 + ηi 2 , where E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift (bid = 50, alpha = 0)
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200.0
175.0
150.0

Parameter

125.0
Sigma
97.5 Percentile
2.5 Percentile

100.0
75.0
50.0
25.0
0.0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Sig eps_1

28

9/6/2006

Figure 4. Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ 0 I 2 + δ 1 I 2 ( bi 2 ) + ηi 2 , E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100.
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift with Bid Interaction (bid = 100, alpha
= 0)
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Figure 5. Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ 0 I 2 + δ 1 I 2 ( bi 2 ) + ηi 2 , where E(bi1)=50 <
E(WTPi0)=100. (a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift with Bid Interaction (bid = 50, alpha
= 0)
140.0
120.0

Estimate

100.0
80.0

WTP
97.5 Percentile
2.5 Percentile

60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Sig eps_1

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift with Bid Interaction (bid = 50, alpha = 0)
200.0
175.0
150.0

Parameter

125.0
Sigma
97.5 Percentile
2.5 Percentile

100.0
75.0
50.0
25.0
0.0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Sig eps_1

30

9/6/2006

Figure 6. Mean WTP Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ I 2 + ηi 2 , and α ij = - 20 .
(a) E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100 , (b) E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift (bid = 100, alpha = [-20])
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Figure 7. Mean WTP Simulation results for WTPi 2 = WTPi 0 + δ 0 I 2 + δ 1 I 2 ( bi 2 ) + ηi 2 , and α ij = - 20
(a) E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100 , (b) E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100

Updating Both Bids - Structural Shift with Bid Interaction (bid = 100, alpha = [-20])
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